It is the right of the United Arab Emirates and each country to normalize relations with Israel and to use those relations to put pressure on other concessions, such as the cessation of settlements. It could also provide a broader opportunity for broader dialogue and wider debate between these countries, the Palestinian side and other Arab countries. This new willingness to dialogue could lead to a new strategy inspired by some tenants of the Oslo agreement, to put an end to suffering and reverse the losses for the Palestinian issue and to bring back the idea of a two-state solution. Through this informal and provisional agreement, the three powers pledged to refrain from any devaluation of competition and to keep currencies at their current level as long as this attempt did not seriously undermine domestic prosperity. The tripartite agreement was an international monetary agreement concluded by the United States, France and Great Britain in September 1936 to stabilize the currencies of their nations, both domestically and in international foreign exchange markets. [1] Over the years, the regional reactions of Arab history to strategic initiatives related to Israel and the Palestinian cause have all been strong. The evidence lies in the reactions in the region to the adoption of Resolution 242 of Egypt and the “Rogers” initiative adopted by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser, where many of them accused Nasser of betraying the Palestinian and Arab cause. The 1973 ceasefire, the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and the Mena House talks also saw President Sadat accused of treason. The lack of a unified Arab position was also manifested by the mixed reactions to Iraq`s invasion of Kuwait. On 25 May 1950, France, Great Britain and the United States, anxious to further stabilize ceasefire agreements and control the flow of arms to the Middle East, announced their decision to stabilize the situation in the region by an agreement between them, not to deliver weapons to a state with aggressive sdesigns. They also agreed, both inside and outside the N.S., to take steps to prevent any changes to the ceasefire lines. The text of the statement is followed. 4.

A number of provocative questions are raised: does the absence of an Arab position before the “agreement of the century” (including the possible loss of the Palestinian territories) raise questions about the extent to which Arab states are willing to sacrifice Palestinian interests for their own national objectives under the tripartite agreement? Or could the possibility of ending annexation in exchange for bilateral relations constitute a fair compromise and have a positive long-term impact on Israeli society? And could Biden`s victory in the U.S. presidential election create the positive atmosphere in which serious negotiations could resume, absorb some of the negative effects of the annexation decision and open the door to new initiatives? It is natural to imagine the immediate and emotional rejection of the agreement by Palestinians who feel betrayed by their Arab counterparts and the Arab community.